9/11 Report Readers' Guide:

Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda Connections with Countries Around the World
Attention to Terrorism: Clinton Administration
Attention to Terrorism: Bush Administration
Attorney General John Ashcroft: Ignored Warnings
Border Security
Congress
Counterterrorism Strategy
Events of 9/11
Evidence of a Coming Attack
FAA and NORAD
Iraq and al Qaeda
Iraq Obsession in the Bush White House
Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs)

Al Qaeda
P 51: "Why do 'they' hate us?" And "what can we do to stop these attacks?"
P 383: Commission conclusion: "Although Americans may be safer, they are not safe."
P 363: Al Qaeda "continues to pose a grave threat."
P 170: Al Qaeda funded almost entirely through donations.
P 199: Killing Osama bin Ladin would not end the al Qaeda threat.
P 169: 9/11 plotters spent between $400,000 and $500,000 on the attack.
P 58: Al Qaeda's connections to other terrorist groups Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiya.

Al Qaeda Connections with Countries Around the World
P 67: In the Middle East, al Qaeda had known collaborative ties to Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Somalia, as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan.
P 171: Al Qaeda finds Saudi Arabia a "fertile fundraising ground"
P 241: Commission advocates further investigation of al Qaeda/Hezbollah ties.
P 240: Iran facilitates travel of al Qaeda members.
P 64: Pakistan facilitates bin Laden's return to Afghanistan.

Attention to Terrorism: Clinton Administration
P 174: President Clinton "deeply concerned" about Osama Bin Ladin.
P 101: President Clinton makes chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorism a priority.
P 109: Clinton Administration establishes "the Bin Ladin unit."
P 358: Clinton Administration's management of the last weeks of December 1999 was "the one period in which the government as a whole seemed to be acting in concert to deal with terrorism."
P 487: Clinton Administration successful in arresting al Qaeda members.
P 457: Richard Clarke runs exercise where terrorists use plane for suicide mission.

Attention to Terrorism: Bush Administration
P 202: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz argued against retaliation for the bombing of the USS Cole, saying the issue was "stale"
P 208: President Bush neglected to fill the key counterterrorism policy office in the Pentagon after the former official departed January 20.
P 201: Richard Clarke submits memo to Condoleezza Rice saying "we urgently need... a Principals level review on the al Qida network."
P 201: No Principals Committee meeting on al Qaeda held until September 4, 2001.
P 203: Principals Committee meetings on Iraq and Sudan before one on al Qaeda.
P 509: Bush administration holds 32 Principals Committee meetings on subjects other than al Qaeda before 9/11.
P 200: Rice downgrades the Counterterrorism Security Group.
P 197: December 2000 "Blue Sky" memo on terrorism urges increased support to Northern Alliance and Uzbeks to fight Taliban and al Qaeda.
P 202: White House postpones aid to Northern Alliance and Uzbeks.

Attorney General John Ashcroft: Ignored Warnings
P 209: Former FBI assistant director for counterterrorism, Dale Watson, says that Attorney General John Ashcroft was "not supportive" of building up capacities to combat terrorism.
P 265: Former Acting FBI Director Pickard says that Ashcroft told him "he did not want to hear about the threats anymore."
P 210: Ashcroft denies an appeal from the FBI for more counterterrorism funding.
P 539: Ashcroft does not fairly reflect the effect of the 1995 Reno and Gorelick memos.

Border Security
P 168: Report underscores "how significant travel was in the planning undertaken by a terrorist organization as far-flung as al Qaeda."
P 186: Clarke outlines need for strengthening America's porous borders.
P 187: Border security undermined by "weak, chronically underfunded executive agencies and powerful congressional committees, which were more responsive to well-organized interest groups."
P 265: In the months before 9/11, "the borders were not hardened. Transportation systems were not fortified."

Congress
P 104: In absence of detailed leadership from the administration, "national security tends not to rise very high on the list of congressional priorities."
P 107: Congress failed to pay attention to terrorism and homeland security.
P 478: Speaker of the House turns down Select Committee on Terrorism and establishes a working group instead.

Counterterrorism Strategy
P 363: Counterterrorism strategy "demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense."
P 109: Clinton Administration establishes "the Bin Ladin unit."
P 63: Osama Bin Ladin, "significantly weakened" by Clinton Administration efforts, leaves Sudan.
P 358: Clinton Administration's management of the last weeks of December 1999 was "the one period in which the government as a whole seemed to be acting in concert to deal with terrorism."
P 197: Richard Clarke drafts "Strategy for Eliminating Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qaida" in late 2000.
P 213: In September 4, 2001 memo, Clarke calls for taking out terrorist camps in Afghanistan and warns otherwise, "You are left with a modest effort to swat flies... You are left waiting for the big attack, with lots of casualties. "
P 509: President Bush uses terrorism as justification for missile defense.

Events of 9/11
P 18: "On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen."
P 35: President Bush's initial reaction to first plane hitting the World Trade Center - "pilot error."
P 41: No documentary evidence for a call between President Bush and Vice President Cheney authorizing the shootdown of planes.

Evidence of a Coming Attack
P 255: Clarke tells Rice that "he thought there were terrorist cells within the United States, including al Qaeda."
P 254: President Bush received "more than 40 intelligence articles in the PDBs from January 20 to September 10, 2001 that related to Bin Ladin."
P 259: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz questions reporting on Bin Ladin, including "Bin Ladin Threats Are Real."
P 272: Phoenix memo advising of the "'possibility of a coordinated effort by Usama Bin Ladin' to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation schools" slips through the cracks.
P 257: Intelligence reports in 2001 titled: "Bin Ladin Attacks May be Imminent," "Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats."
P 260: Presidential Daily Brief titled, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S."
P 256: Clark warns in March 2001, "When these attacks occur, as they likely will, we will wonder what more we could have done to stop them."
P 257: Threat advisories in June 2001 indicate high probability of near-term "spectacular" terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda activity indicating attack planning reaches "a crescendo."
P 263: Clarke warns Rice at least twice in 2001 about al Qaeda sleeper cells in U.S.
P 275: August 2001, CIA Director George Tenet gets memo, "Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly"

FAA and NORAD
P 11: FAA lacks "adequate appreciation" of "responsibility for the safety and security of civil aviation."
P 264: Domestic agencies "did not have a game plan" to deal with threat reporting in 2001.
P 45: "NORAD and the FAA were unprepared" for the 9/11 attacks.
P 457: FAA sees sabotage as the most significant threat to civil aviation.
P 83: FAA "no-fly" list contained only 12 terrorist suspects' names.

Iraq and al Qaeda
P 66: No "collaborative operational relationship" between Iraq and al Qaeda.
P 559: "No credible evidence" supporting Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz's theory that Iraq was involved in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.
P 61: Osama Bin Ladin sponsors anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraq.
P 468: CIA memoranda linking Bin Ladin and Iraqi intelligence chief discredited.
P 228: Allegation that Mohamed Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer: "No evidence has been found that Atta was in the Czech Republic in April 2001."
P 161: Mohamad Atta sees Saddam Hussein as "an American stooge set up to give Washington an excuse to intervene in the Middle East."
P 470: Alleged ties between Al Qaeda and Iraq recanted.

Iraq Obsession in the Bush White House
P 331: The evening of September 11, Secretary Rumsfeld urges the President to think about the possibility that Iraq may have harbored the attackers.
P 334: Richard Clarke says that "on the evening of September 12, President Bush told him and some of his staff to explore possible Iraqi links to 9/11" - "See if he's linked in any way."
P 335: On September 12, Secretary Rumsfeld says "his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time."
P 335: According to Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz "was always of the view that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with... and he saw this as one way of using this event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem."
P 335: Rice told to plan for Iraq.
P 335: President Bush orders Defense Department to be ready to deal with Iraq, with "plans to include possibly occupying Iraqi oil fields."
P 336: On September 17, Wolfowitz contends the odds were "far more" than one in ten that Saddam was involved in the 9/11 attacks.
P 560: Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith sends memo to Secretary Rumsfeld on September 20, 2001 suggesting attacking Iraq instead of Afghanistan to surprise the terrorists.

Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs)
P 533: White House declines permitting all 9/11 commissioners to review PDBs.
P 254: President Bush received "more than 40 intelligence articles in the PDBs from January 20 to September 10, 2001 that related to Bin Ladin."
P 260: Bush's response to reading the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Brief, entitled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US."
P 262: Commission finds "no indication of any further discussion" about the threat of an al Qaeda attack after August 6, 2001.
P 128: Clinton Administration responds to 1998 Presidential Daily Brief.