Many of the US strategic processes, models and doctrine employ a reductionist and linear analytical methodology, whichattempts to reduce an adversary’s capabilities and strengths into component parts. The globalterrorist structures of today are not machines or nation states whose component parts areconstrained by organizational structures and processes, which can be analyzed with linear
reductionist methodologies. Indeed, networks appear to be highly resilient and evolvespecifically to survive destruction of its seemingly most vital component parts. Reductionistmodels and tools used by today’s senior leaders may not by themselves sufficiently clarify the pervasive ambiguity and complexities presented by the threat of anti-American global terrorism.8
Conversely, alternative theories that bring into focus networks and dynamic systems may helpinform a US strategy to defeat global terrorism.

The alternative theory this paper examines is Complexity Theory.  Complexity Theory views behaviors and actions as the interrelationship between
a great many components parts.10 It refers to these interrelationships or systems as complex,because it is impossible to fully understand these systems by reducing them to an examinationof their constituent parts.11 Instead, Complexity Theory holds that interactions producecollective behaviors and characteristics that are not exhibited when the components parts are
examined individually.12 This is in contrast with reductionist theories, which seek tocomprehend a phenomenon by examining its individual attributes and are insufficient tounderstand complex networks.  Using Complexity Theory as a guide, this paper analyses al Qaeda as part of a globalanti-American Islamic terrorist network and develops recommendations to improve the US
strategy aimed at defeating terrorists from perpetrating further catastrophic acts against theUnited States homeland.

What is "Complexity Theory"?  it is the study of self-reinforcing interdependent interactions and how much such interactionscreate evolution, fitness and surprise.  - "Complexity Theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining Complex Leadership," Russ Marion and Mary Uhl-Bien, Leadership”, Presented at Managing
the Complex IV: A Conference on Complex Systems and the Management of Organizations, Fort Meyers, Florida, December 2002.

Complexity Theory views behaviors as the constantly changing interdependent interactions. These interactions ofevolving systems or networks are very different from traditional hierarchical top-down systems,as emergence, self-organization and resilience become the three fundamental characteristics ofcomplex networks.

Marion and Uhl-Bien, experts in the field of complexity and organizational theories,described emergence as a phenomenon by which networks are generated from need seeking entities -- called agents.18 These agents are driven by local assessments and motivated bynecessity to couple with other agents forming interdependent relationships to the mutualfulfillment of their individual requirements. Therefore, complex dynamic networks
spontaneously propagate and are not created by central deterministic intelligence. Emergencealso consists of the phenomenon in which interrelationships between large numbers ofdisparate agents create collective novel behavior and act as a single purposeful entity. Thenetwork exhibits behavior that the constituents could not attain individually. Simply described, a
complex dynamic system is always greater than sum of its parts.19

Stuart Kauffman, a biologist and complexity theorist, determined that self-organization isthe fundamental characcharacteristic of complex dynamic networks.20 Five fundamental elements ofself-organizing networks are adaptation, correlation, coupling, aggregation and recursion.Complex networks are referred to as “adaptive” or “dynamic”, because they are constantly
changing their interrelationships based upon the needs of individual agents and environmentalimpacts. John Holland, a pioneer in the field of complexity, coined the term “complex adaptiveagents” to describe the constantly evolving nature of complex systems.21 Individual agentswithin the network are constantly reassessing their need preferences and the degree to whichthey will compromise to bond with other agents.22 Consequently, the network adapts through
the process of compromise and competition, called correlation, in which each entity accepts,rejects or changes its relationship with other agents based upon its needs and the changingenvironment. Kauffman referred to the interdependent bonding of agents as “coupling,” andMarion categorized these relationships as loose, moderate or tight.23 Tightly coupled agents
display high degrees of interdependence, while other sets of agents are described asmoderately or only loosely coupled due to low degrees of interdependence. Holland referredthat these sets of agents bond through the process of correlation and are united by sharedpurpose or interest as “aggregates”.24 Aggregates may accumulate with many other sets of
agents or structures to form meta-aggregates and further connect with yet other structures that accomplish diverse functions or roles to then form meta-meta-aggregates. Thisaccumulation of aggregates does not imply hierarchy or fixed structures. Instead complexnetworks are said to be recursive, meaning that through the process of aggregation and
correlation the network develops redundant multi-way chains of causality to accomplish itscollective interests and contribute to the network’s resilience.25
Resilience is the capability of complex networks to absorb or recuperate from assaults onits constituent parts. The resilience of complex systems can be attributed primarily to its selforganizingcharacteristic. The elements of self-organization enable a complex network tobehave like viruses that spontaneously seek opportunities to spread and adapt in the face of
adversity to form more virulent strains.26 In complex networks adaptation is spontaneous,because innovation emerges from the constituent parts rather than a single directingintelligence.27 Complexity Theory implies that hierarchical organizations can never be asresilient as complex networks, because the power of complex networks resides not within its
leadership or a few capabilities, but within its ability to spontaneously adapt to changes in thesurrounding environment.28 Consequently, multidirectional and redundant pathways ofinterdependent relationships allow networks to survive assaults on its constituent parts.Furthermore, agents change their levels of dependencies (tight, moderate, or loose coupling)
with other agents and aggregates to further enhance their resilience.29 Loosely couplednetworks can absorb changes in the environment and assaults on the network due to the lowinterdependence levels.30 Conversely, tight couplings enhance close coordination andcooperation, but are highly interdependent and as a result they are more vulnerable to
disruption.31 In summary, complex networks adapt and self-organize to seek the optimalbalance of all three types of coupling to enhance their individual and collective performance andresilience.

The fitness of a network is proportional to its degree of emergence and resilience, or saidanother way, its ability to self-propagate and recuperate. A fit network has to have three main elements: first it must have a multitude of individual entities; second those entities must becompelled by a need to interact; and third the network must possess a balance of loose,moderate and tight coupling appropriate to its needs.32 The more broad, urgent and widely
accepted the need or interest, the larger and more fit the network. Therefore, fit networks canemerge from common need preferences that are neither attainable individually nor providedthrough other alternatives.33 A multitude of loose and moderately coupled interrelationshipsallows network to dissipate the impact of assaults or environmental changes.34 Conversely,
tightly coupled networks are vulnerable for disruption, because damage to one part of thenetwork can easily surge across numerous linkages causing network wide damage.35 Likewise,network fitness is vulnerable to alternative structures or other networks that more efficiently oreffectively compete for the need preferences of its agents. Faced with other alternatives, some
loose and some lesser number of moderately coupled agents will choose to bond withstructures that require fewer sacrifices or compromise of their individual need preferences.This paper will now examine al Qaeda’s behavior using the three characteristics ofComplexity Theory described in the previous section to demonstrate that al Qaeda is a complex
dynamic network. Analyzing the 9/11 terrorist plot, terrorist financing and al Qaeda’s broaderorganizational behaviors will show that al Qaeda exhibits the characteristics of emergence, selforganizationand resilience.

The formation of 9/11 terrorist cells as described by the CIA Director, George Tenant, inCongressional testimony provides a clear example of the emergent nature of the al Qaedanetwork. 36 The 9/11 terrorist cells originated from the ordinary friendship between MuhammadAtta and two other foreign students in Hamburg, Germany in the 1990s. The three were
university students from different Middle East countries, and one had been studying aircraftdesign at the Hamburg School of Applied Science. They met at mosques, coffee houses and local gathering places. Although neither they nor the mosque they attended were known for
extremist views, these students were nonetheless drawn together by their increasinglydisenchantment with the West in general and the US in particular. They met with other like mindedMuslim men in an ever-widening circle of acquaintances, which eventually led them to aGerman-Syrian named Muhammad Heydar Zammer who was active in Islamic extremist groups
since 1980. About this same time, the terrorists Ramzi Yousef and the Abu Saif group wereplanning to place timed explosives on passenger airliners bound for the US and use airliners asweapons to fly into the World Trade Center and the CIA headquarters. Yousef discussed hisideas with his uncle Khalid Shaihk Muhammad who was associated with al Qaeda.37 The ideas
and concepts for a massive attack on the US using airliners were now emerging among variousterrorist groups, and Muhammad Atif, a key associate of Osama bin Laden, studied the idea anddiscussed it with bin Laden. Thinking the concept had merit, they communicated the idea andprovided various resource contacts to several other associates around the globe including
Khalid Shaihk Mohammad. About the same time in 1997, through a wide web of acquaintancesMohammed met with Atta and Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker.38 Coupled withMuhammad and armed with this new idea and some financial and technical contacts, Atta andhis associates emerged from a small group of disenchanted university students into a terrorist
cell. In total, the plot expanded to include three cells of 19 hijackers with members originatingfrom seven different countries. All but two of the hijackers had no previous associations toreligious extremism or terrorist organizations as Tenet lamented that 17 of the 19 plotters were“absolutely clean.”39 The 9/11 terrorist cell was not created or directed by a central node or
hierarchical apparatus. Instead, the entities within the network were coupled together by looseinformal associations forming mutually dependant interrelationships with an ever-wideninggroup of like-minded Muslims. Simply stated, the 9/11 cells emerged from the bottom-up.

The global terrorist network appears decidedly resilient to attacks against its component parts, and it is not simply “on the run”.

The popularity of al Qaeda’s goals combined with the lack of alternatives provides for itscontinued emergence, while its diverse levels of interdependencies provide for its resilience.The global Islamic anti-American terrorist network is tremendously fit. Al Qaeda has three sources of fitness: first, several of al Qaeda’s objectives are shared by a multitude of Muslims
and Arabs; second, al Qaeda is comprised of a verity of tight, moderate but primarily looselycoupled aggregates and lastly, al Qaeda benefits from the absence of effective alternatives toextremism.

Although most Middle East expertsunequivocally state that few Muslims accept the legitimacy of terrorism, they nonethelessconcede the broad support for the bin Laden’s goals. Bin Laden articulated these goals in his1998 manifesto which said, “America must know that that the battle will not leave its land, Godwilling, until America leaves our land, until it stops supporting Israel, until it stops the blockade
[now occupation] against Iraq.60 President Bush and many within his administration repeatedlyemphasized that the al Qaeda represents a small minority of Muslims that hate freedom and theAmerican way of life. The reality is much more sobering, as many of bin Laden’s objectives arenot extreme but mainstream. Several of al Qaeda’s interests coincide with those of a great
multitude of Arabs and Muslims who oppose to US Middle East policies. The four commoninterests that fuel the emergence of al Qaeda which are now covered in greater detail are:opposition to US military presence in Saudi Arabia, US support of repressive regimes in theMiddle East, US policies toward Iraq and perceived US support of Israel at the expense of
Palestinians.

Several US supported regimes throughout the region areidentified by Amnesty International as human rights violators.65 Most Arabs clearly see the
hypocrisy of US policy of promoting democracy while bolstering repressive regimes.66 Yousef alKhoei, the head of a moderate Islamic foundation concluded that terrorist organizations “appealto the disenfranchised Muslims everywhere who see the double standard of the UnitedStates.”67Many Muslims and Arabs believe that the US and UN imposed sanctions against Iraq
following the first Gulf War only resulted in the suffering of the Iraqi people rather than punishingSaddam Hussein’s regime.68 The United Nations children’s organization (UNICEF) reportedthat thousands of Iraqi children died each month as a result of sanctions against Iraq while theyseemed to have little effect on the regime.6

The US has provided military, economic and political support to Israel for decades.Even moderate Arabs and Muslims perceive the US support of Israel as having an anti-Araband Muslim bias.71 Several Middle East experts agree that the strong US support of Israel overthe Palestinians has created an equally strong anti-Americanism among Arabs.72 Terrorist
expert and author of Inside Al Qaeda, Rohan Gunarata, concluded that although most Muslimsdo not support political violence there is nonetheless “wide spread resentment” of America’s rolein the Middle East and “especially political, economic and military support of Israel.”73 The US national strategy to defeat terrorism recognized that finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
issue is a central component in combating terrorism.

The demography of Islamic based terrorist organizations provides evidence of the boardacceptance of the four pan Islamic and Arab interests articulated by bin Laden. The profile oftoday’s terrorists is as broad as the Muslim world as they are young, Muslim, male, and comefrom a variety of cultures and nations.75 Many are highly educated doctors, lawyers, and
engineers representing a cross section of the socio-economic strata.76 Diversity among itmembers suggests an expansive base of popular support for al Qaeda’s objectives. Worse yet,the CIA concluded that its potential pool of recruits is growing.77 Over the next 25 years theMiddle East population is projected to double, thereby providing al Qaeda with an expanding
pool of potential supporters.

Estimates on the number ofal Qaeda operatives range from a few thousand to tens of thousands, but this represent a smallfraction of the total population. Support for terrorism also includes a multitude of looselycoupled activities and a lesser number of moderately coupled activities ranging from: willfulnegligence, passive resistance to local authorities, non-cooperation with US and coalition
forces, monetary support of dubious charitable organizations, extremist schools and Mosques,direct financial donations, resistance to banking reforms, drug trafficking, sanctuary forindividual operatives, logistical support and an exhaustive list of other non-violent activities that either directly or indirectly support the terrorist networks. These larger segments of loosely and
moderately coupled aggregates are characterized by lesser degrees of correlation andinterdependence. Furthermore, as evidenced by the emergence of the 9/11 plot, the tightlycoupled terrorist cells emerge from the ranks of the loosely coupled sympathetic. It is thevariety and size of these moderate and loosely coupled segments that provides al Qaeda with
its recuperative and propagative fitness.

Sources of Emergence
US forces in Saudi Arabia
US support of repressive regimes
US policies toward Iraq
Israeli-Palestinian issue

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
The goals and objectives articulated in the current US strategy are all necessaryelements to disrupt future acts of catastrophic terror against the US homeland.84 However,attacking the constituent parts of the al Qaeda network will not by itself defeat it. The elementsof Al Qaeda’s fitness ensure that it will survive even the deaths of its most celebrated leaders
and loss of its sanctuaries.  Other than recognizing the importance of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict in “winningthe war of ideas,” the US strategy does not address the other three sources of emergence, nordoes the strategy recognize the criticality of the loosely coupled aspects of the network to alQaeda’s overall fitness. Although the current strategy proposes strengthening the ability of
weak states to battle terrorism and coercing the cooperation of states unwilling to support thewar on terrorism, the strategy has no provisions for strengthening legitimate alternatives toterrorism in achieving popular pan-Islamic interests. The current US strategy must expand itsgoals and objectives to directly address the elements of al Qaeda’s fitness.

A strategy that diminishes the multitude of loosely coupled agents and aggregates thatsupport the al Qaeda network will make it less fit.

A strategy to diminish the loosely coupled segment of the terrorist network will have toaccomplish two objectives: first, the strategy must identify, foster and enable alternativestructures or networks that compete against terrorism and second, the strategy needs to redress the four sources of anti-American sentiment.

The US must identify, foster and enable any structures that provide non-violentalternatives to terrorism. Proliferating and strengthening non-violent alternatives to terrorism willconstrict the al Qaeda network. Alternative non-violent networks capable of effectivelysatisfying common need preferences of Muslims will attract more constituents than a terrorist
organization for the simple reason that interrelationships with the terrorist network poses greaterindividual risk and requires higher levels of correlation. Alternative structures could include avariety of different organizations such as multilateral and international organizations, moderateIslamic religious groups, non-governmental agencies and national governments. The essential
quality of these organizations is their individual or combined ability to employ political, economicor informational powers to redress the sources of al Qaeda’s emergence. The US shouldquietly support and connect these structures as a network to compete against al Qaeda.Although it is unlikely that such structures would dissuade the relatively few “true believes” who
are committed to violence against the US, it would make them more vulnerable to attack.Military and economic aspects of the current deterrence strategy in turn would increase the risksof supporting terrorist organizations and contribute to the attractiveness of alternative nonviolentstructures.

To accomplish the second strategic objective of reducing the four sources of anti-American sentiment, the US must focus all its elements of power together with the internationalcommunity to establish policies that diminish the sources of al Qaeda’s emergence.Specifically, the US and its allies must work to find a solution to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict.
The current US strategy to combat terrorism recognizes, “that no other issue has so colored theperception of the United States.”87 The US cannot afford unconditional support for repressiveregimes in return for cooperation in fighting terrorism. Unconditional support for repressiveregimes increases emergence of new terrorist entities and is counterproductive to the goal of
defeating the network. The US should continue to support the counter terrorism efforts of itsMiddle East allies, while simultaneously strengthening political reform, economic assistance andeducational programs. These policies will increase the legitimacy of the governments in theregion, serve to further isolate the terrorist network, and establish these governments as
alternatives to terrorism. Finally, the establishment of a stable Iraqi government, which has the willing support of its population and a subsequent withdrawal of US forces from both Iraq andSaudi Arabia, will help ameliorate anti-American ideology. Combined with the current aspectsof US strategy, these four strategic objectives will form a more holistic strategy to defeat the
anti-American global network of Islamic terrorism.

CONCLUSION
The evidence provided by this examination of al Qaeda’s behaviors clearly supports theproposition that global terrorism is a complex dynamic network. Al Qaeda is more accuratelydescribed as part of a global network of interdependent agents who display emergent, selforganizingand resilient characteristics. Al Qaeda’s fitness is fueled by a multitude of Muslims
and Arabs who are sympatric to its goals and arrayed in a variety of tight, moderate, butprimarily loosely coupled entities. The lack of effective alternatives to terrorism contributes to this network’s fitness. The current elements of the US strategy to directly defeat the efforts of
terrorists are necessary components in limiting or disrupting the terrorist network. However, noUS counter terrorism strategy will long succeed without reducing the sources from which theterrorist network emerged and without diminishing the loosely coupled aggregates that supportit. To defeat al Qaeda the US must diminish the loosely coupled segments of the network to
attack the network’s emergent, self-organizing and resilient characteristics. To accomplish thisgoal the US must strengthening alternative structures that effectively compete against al Qaedain meeting the need preferences of Arab Muslims. This strategy combined with policies aimedat diminishing the four sources of ant-Americanism, will increase the networks isolation and
make it more vulnerable to the elements of the current strategy.

- "Observing Al Queda Through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism," Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Beech, United States Army, July 2004.

This publication and other CSL publications can be found online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp